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Abstract
The thesis introduces a range of communication protocols used to implement-
ing smart homes currently available on the market. Two protocols are chosen
and theoretically analysed in depth. The analysis both describes how the pro-
tocols works and describes the measures taken in order to protect it against
attacks from third parties. The theoretical evaluation analyses how susceptible
the protocols are against the replay and eavesdropping attacks. The theoret-
ical evaluation is followed by a case study where one of the communication
protocols are analysed practically. During the case study a smart home using
the chosen protocol is set up. The network is then attacked with the attacks
described in the theoretical evaluation. The theoretical and practical outcomes
are compared to see if they match. During this study the theoretical and prac-
tical outcome did not match due to faulty use of the protocol. The faulty use
of the protocol prevented the equipment from differentiating authentic and in-
authentic parties which made the equipment susceptible. However, the case
study only represents a sample of the technology being used and the faulty use
is caused by one manufacturer. Thus the protocol can not be deemed unsafe
solely based on the outcome of the case study.
Keywords: MSc, Communications protocol, Integration Solutions, Internet of Things
(IoT), Security, Protocol Analysis, Home Automation
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) has in recent years become a hot topic amongst technology
enthusiasts and industry. It is a technological paradigm in which billions of heterogeneous
devices are connected with each other forming a network of interconnected devices, e.g.
The Internet of Things. Thus, enabling devices to communicate amongst each other as
well as human beings. IoT is promised to have a profound impact on our lives, for instance
as an enabler of smart homes where the connectivity of devices lets users remotely control,
automate and monitor home appliances.
From a historical perspective, it has not been obvious that IoT could ever be realized.
Reasons such as high cost of sensors, high energy consumption of wireless devices and the
non existing Internet connectivity of appliances has been arguments amongst its critics.
However, due to developments in the last decade today’s technology enables anyone
to set up their own smart home. Along with the increased popularity, questions regarding
the security of the technology and the integrity of the users have been raised.
There are studies showing how Internet of Things could improve different aspects of
different industries such as, but not limited to, the manufacturing industry [1][2] or trans-
portation industry [3]. Besides the previously mentioned industries Internet of Things is
a paradigm relevant when developing smart homes. A smart home differs from an ordi-
nary home by having its home appliances integrated with the Internet and allowing them
to communicate with each other. The functionality of the appliances are then controlled
remotely. Besides remote control it also allows the users to automate and monitor a lot
of their home activity. An appliance can control elementary functionality such as turn-
ing on a light, regulating the heating, regulating the air conditioner or unlocking a door.
However, to make an appliance support the smart home system the manufacturer has to
integrate hardware and software supporting desired functionality. In other words, each
appliance must be able to communicate with other appliances on the network. Each de-
vice that is a part of the smart home network makes use of an communications protocol,
which can be seen as a standardised way to communicate amongst other participants in the
network. Presently there is no a determined standard to use when integrating the hardware
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and software in to a product.
Internet of Things, as previously mentioned, is a way to interconnect devices of any
type to each other and to the Internet. In the past it has merely been a pipe dream to get
two devices to surpass the machine-to-machine (M2M) communication, and to allow a
unification between different appliances from different manufacturers. Imagine devices
communicating with each other without a human being overseeing it.
Smart homes and home automation is becoming more common with every year that
passes and is estimated to grow even bigger in the near future [4]. With the rise in popu-
larity more users are concerned with questions revolving the security and the integrity of
the user.
With the rapid evolving and rise in popularity of smart homes there are also a lot of
questions emerging. Some of these surrounding the protection against an unauthorised
unit or user gaining access to the appliances. Questions such as: what is done in order
to protect the user from a potential home invasion? What is done in order to protect the
integrity of the user when information is uploaded to the Internet? What makes each
protocol unique, and keeps each home solution separate from each other? What ensures
that the wireless communication is kept secure from third parties? These are just a fraction
of what users are concerned about. The answers to these questions are dependent on the
communication protocol the user is using.
This thesis will evaluate two of the existing standards from a security point of view.
The question that we focus on is the non-authenticated access, in other words, denying
third parties access to functions or information that makes the smart home vulnerable.
Several essential points will be analysed on each communications protocol, and also two
different scenarios of attacks will be simulated theoretically. The theoretical analysis will
be followed by a practical case study (demonstration) where the same scenario will be
evaluated.
1.1 Background
The availability of Internet and smart phones has in recent years become drastically im-
proved, providing services to anyone at a low cost. The availability enables the existence
of networks independent of size. Besides the availability more devices tend to support
WiFi technology which enables them to connect to the Internet. These factors are the
main causes to why Internet of Things is a hot topic in the current technology era.
When implementing a network that is using the Internet of Things paradigm several
technical challenges and difficulties are encountered. An example of a previous major
challenge is that the implementation of a home network required rewiring of electrical
outputs and circuits in homes. The rewiring is not impossible, however, it requires a high
budget. However, the rewiring issue can be avoided in recent protocols since most proto-
cols use radio frequencies to communicate. Another example of a challenge and difficulty
has been the security of a network. To be able to provide a secure solution where the users
privacy and their network is protected against malicious activity. Some of the security
challenges stem from not being able to hide the communication that is done over the radio
frequencies, thus being available to anyone in the communications proximity.
When setting up a network there are several different techniques a user could use to get
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the appliances to communicate amongst each other, such a technique is called an Integra-
tion platform or an Integration platform. All integration platforms consists of a commu-
nication protocol that describe communication related specifications, such as topologies
used, routing, frequency band, et cetera. When implementing the communication proto-
col a combination of both hardware and software is used. The architecture is dependent
on which integration platform that is studied. However, due to the rise in availability of
wireless communication most integration platforms developed today has a similar ground
layer specifying the physical communication form. Although they may be similar some of
their specifications differ, such as the frequency band used.
A smart home is a home environment where the resident is able to remotely control
functionalities provided by the home appliances and where the home appliances are able
to communicate amongst each other. Thus the Internet of Things paradigm is connected
to the smart home. One of the earliest reported concepts of a smart home was presented
in 1975 with the use of an Integration platform called X10 [5]. The platform used power
line wiring in order to signal and control home appliances. X10 has been updated some
but still remains as an alternative when setting up a smart home.
An example of a scenario how a smart home could work is when the toaster and the
smoke detector communicate. Imagine that bread gets stuck in the toaster, the smoke
detector senses the smoke and tries to communicate with the home appliances in order
to locate the smoke source. Another example of a smart home scenario could be when
the resident is able to read and regulate the temperature in different parts of their home
through their smart phone, since it forces a communication between the thermostat and air
conditioning systems.
An example of what a smart home can consist of is demonstrated in the figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Demonstrates what a smart home can consist of.
Phones use a different frequency when communicating therefore
it sends messages through the Internet which are then relayed
through a gateway.
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With the growingmarket for smart homesmore companies tend to produce devices that
support the existing integration platforms [4]. However, when a company decides to de-
velop products supporting the technology, they have to decide which integration platform
to use. Currently there are a few different integration platforms available on the market
and no standard is set.
The security of a smart home is considered to be one of the key questions when intro-
ducing a platform. With a non-secure platform, a smart home could be susceptible to a
variety of different attacks, which could leave the resident unsafe in their own home. An
attack performed by a unauthorised party outside the network is called a third party access
attack.
A short list of different third party attacks and their causes when targeting smart homes
follows:
• Sniffing/Eavesdropping - An eavesdropping attack is carried out by listening on a
conversation between two other parties. This attack can be carried out if the plat-
forms used communicate in clear text, since there is nothing stopping an attacker
from using a receiver to pick up the communication between the participants when
the communication is using a wireless solution.
• Man-in-the-middle - In a man-in-the-middle attack the attacker pretends to be a
part of the targeted network, but in reality it stands in between two communicating
units. As the man-in-the-middle it relays messages received on both ends to the
believed destination, and therefore it is able to partake in the conversations. A man-
in-the-middle attack can be performed if the platform uses an inadequate way to
authenticate parties in the network.
• Replay attack - A replay attack is performed by eavesdropping and re-sending com-
munication picked up. A smart home could be susceptible to a replay attack if the
integration platform uses an inadequate way to authenticate parties or packets.
There are professional organisations that both develop and study security standards
which are used when constructing communication protocols. The standards are used to
ensure security for its users and to keep the protocols homogeneous. An example of such
an organisation is the Institute of Electrical and Electric Engineers (IEEE), which consists
of 426000 members. The organisations goal is to advance and innovate technology for the
benefit of humanity [6]. IEEE has standardised partial layers of communication protocols
which are commonly used in wireless communication, such as the IEEE 802.15.04. The
802.15.04 protocol uses the physical layer of the conceptual model described in the OSI
model, where the data is transmitted in raw bit streams over a physical medium [7].
The communication in a smart home tend to become monotonous, and in order to
enforce variation in the communication a randomised value is used. During each conver-
sation between two parties a new randomised value is generated. The randomised value
is called a nonce value, which is an acronym for Number used ONCE (NONCE). Without
the use of nonce values parties communicating have a hard time proving the session au-
thenticity and the originality of the communication. Thus some communication protocols
tend to use nonce values.
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1.2 Problem Statement
The growing market for smart homes will likely lead to the everyday person will encounter
a smart home in the near future. However, the security may prevent the whole progress
and growth of the market. It is not too far fetched to state that the consumers might find
it daunting to live in a smart home if they lack trust in its security. Just imagine the con-
sequences of a potential intruder, or a third party, gaining access to the functionality in a
smart home, such as the security camera or the front door. It can concluded that a company
has to consider the security risks and security precautions of a platform before choosing
it.
In order to restrict the study to a subgroup of platforms we only consider the platforms
which are not directly connected to the power line. Another attribute that is highly valued
for selecting a platform is that the products should be from today’s market. This is deter-
mined by how relevant the platform is today, in other words how widely the platform is
spread and used, and also the platforms potential to grow even further in the market.
To narrow the range of available platforms we set a few requirements on the platforms.
One of the requirements we set on our platforms is that it should be completely wireless,
between the controller and the devices. The requirement allowed us to exclude platforms
where there are partial wiring to the electrical sockets or similar stationary platforms,
which made the case study easier.
The thesis will try to give answers to the following questions:
RQ1 How is security handled by contemporary IoT communication protocols with regard
to unauthorised third party access attacks?
RQ2 Which of the studied IoT communication protocols provides better security with
regard to how they handle unauthorised third party access attacks?
RQ3 What are the challenges of implementing a smart home appliance using an existing
IoT integration platform with regard to how they handle unauthorised third party
access attacks?
1.3 Method
We conducted a literature study in order to choose which communication protocols to eval-
uate. The studywas performed by identifying different communication protocols, focusing
on integration platforms, for smart homes using primarily Google Scholar. We included
only those platforms that were mentioned by the top 10 number of articles when searching
with the keywords wireless home automation networks, smart home wireless protocols,
etc. Among the protocols identified, we selected two for a more thorough analysis.
In order to get some more background before choosing which communication proto-
cols to evaluate, a literature study is carried out. The study consisted of analysing the
protocols found when searching for smart homes and integration platforms on the search
engine, Google Scholar. A brief introduction of the top results is presented and two pro-
tocols are selected for further analysis.
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This study’s revolves around the security measures used to protect against third party
attacks giving the third parties unauthorised access to the data and functionality. Even
though some of the protocols might have other security problems, such as physical at-
tacks, e.g. breaking a lock on a door, these kind of attacks will not be considered in this
evaluation.
The chosen protocols are thoroughly introduced and their protocols are dissected in
order to gain some deeper understanding of the communication between the different layers
and what is accompanied with the actual data when a packet is sent.
After gaining a thorough understanding of the protocol structure, it’s layers and their
functions, and the measures taken to secure the communication are presented. Anything
that is considered to be a part of the security is included in the evaluation and are presented
with a brief explanation of their functionality.
Any third party developed feature, such as encryption algorithms or encoding, are also
to some extent introduced and explained since it is considered a part of the system even
though it is not developed by the manufacturers. If there are any known security liabilities
in the third party features they are also presented.
After explaining the selected protocols from a security perspective a subsection fol-
lows in which attack scenarios are outlined and the outcome of running the scenarios are
reasoned about based on the available information. Due to restriction on both resources
and time, the only two attacks chosen for the scenarios in this thesis are Replay attack and
Eavesdropping attack. However, the outcome of these two attacks will demonstrate how
secure the authentication and the encryption process is.
The following two scenarios will be used:
Replay Attack
1. Connect Unit-A so it controls a lamp/light bulb (receiver).
2. Unit-B sniffs the traffic.
3. Unit-A sends a request to switch the lamp/light bulb on.
4. Confirm that the receiver changes state.
5. Unit-A sends a new request to switch the lamp/light bulb off.
6. Confirm that the receiver changes state.
7. Unit-B does a replay attack by resending the first packet, trying to turn on the
lamp/light bulb.
8. The attack is successful if the receiver changes state.
Unit-A is the unit which should have access to the functionality, also referred to as
transceiver. The receiving component is connected to the lamp/light bulb. Unit-B is
the unit which should not have access to the functionality and should be excluded
from the network.
Eavesdropping and deciphering status attack
1. Connect Unit-A so it controls a lamp/light bulb (receiver).
2. Unit-B tries to communicate with the lamp/light bulb.
12
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3. The attack is successful if unit-A responds with its current state/condition
(on/off).
Unit-A is the unit which should have access to the functionality, also referred to as
transceiver. The receiving component is connected to the lamp/light bulb. Unit-B is
the unit which should not have access to the functionality and should be excluded
from the network.
The theoretical evaluation is then concluded with a review on how vulnerable the pro-
tocol might be. To determine the vulnerability the review consists of analysing the protocol
from the following four different aspects:
• Authentication process - When communicating with another party in the network
it is important to use a proper authentication process. The authentication process
ensures that the parties indeed are whom the claim to be, and identifies each party in
the network. An inadequate authentication process can result in the fact that outside
parties gain access to functionality within the network.
• Protocol - Each platform implements, or uses a predefined, protocol when construct-
ing the messages transmitted between the parties in a network. If the protocol has
known vulnerabilities, or security flaws, the whole platform becomes vulnerable. A
vulnerability in a protocol could literately be caused by a wrongful definition or a
bug defined in the protocol. We use Google Scholar in order to discover existing
vulnerabilities.
• Functionality exposure - Most platforms require that each component, using their
technology, provide a group of basic platform-related functionality, such as relaying
messages and broadcasting messages. The components should provide some func-
tionality for external use while some should remain private. Is it ensured that the
public functionality is separated from the private functionality.
• Denial of service attacks - Does the platform protect itself from high stress attacks?
A typical way to stress a system is to perform a denial of service attack, where the
attacker overloads the system with too many requests causing it to eventually crash.
The theoretical evaluation is followed by a chapter describing a case study. One of the
evaluated protocols are physically tested. The scenarios used in the case study are the same
scenarios used in the theoretical evaluation. The results of both the theoretical evaluation
and the case study are presented in the chapter concluding the thesis.
1.4 Related Work
This thesis is based on the security aspect of integration platforms, and will focus on spe-
cific platforms that already exist. The idea of a smart home has been coined by the Amer-
ican Association of Housebuilders in 1984 [8], and there is plenty of work describing
possibilities as well as the current problems.
In their paper [9] Fischerström et. al. present a security analysis of the potential soft-
ware issues encountered when using a wireless smart home. The thesis introduces three
13
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different integration platforms briefly along with several different known attacks such as
Man in the middle, ARP spoofing, Replay attack and Denial of service. The risk analysis
and implementation of the attacks, Replay attack and Cross-Site Request Forgery, are both
presented. The replay attack was unsuccessful when using their platform. However, in this
thesis other integration platforms and other equipment is used to preform a similar attack
and other attacks. The use of different equipment and a different platform may result in a
differentiating outcome.
In [10], Liu et. al. presents some of the security, privacy and key issues when dis-
cussing Internet of Things. The paper stands as a research presenting what challenges
that have been solved and some challenges that still remain unsolved. Both security fea-
tures and security requirements of the different protocol layers are presented to separate
the different key mechanisms, such as key agreements, encryption, authentications and
anti-ddos functions. The layer instructions presents what mechanisms should be used on
which layer, and the reasoning behind their placement. Whilst the goal and aim of the pa-
per may hugely differ from this thesis, it is related in the sense that the directions given in
the paper are easily traceable in this thesis. However, the attacks considered in this thesis
are mainly directed at the application layer and the network layer, which are two of the
four introduced in the paper.
In their paper [11], Babar et. al. present the objectives of Internet of Things so the
reader understands what the motives and purposes of Internet of Things is. The objectives
is then followed with security requirements surrounding the privacy, trust and authenti-
cation of the data along with their related security threats. The importance of using a
thorough security model when implementing a network is argued. In their argument they
state that the popularity and availability of Internet of Things is highly dependent on the
privacy and security provided in the platform. Implying that if security measures are taken
lightly or are overseen it can decrease the adoption among the Internet of Things users. To
conclude their paper they provide a new security model where they use a cube model to
depict the security. The three dimensions consist of Security, privacy and trust. The paper
uses good arguments to why the security is of grave importance to both the user as well as
the growth and realisation of Internet of Things.
In their paper [12], Olawumi et. al. reports how a platform handles a variety of unau-
thorised third party access attacks. The paper presents a security overview of the platform
used where information about how the communication is set up and handled. The pa-
per demonstrates how the laboratory environment used is set up. After documenting the
environment the unauthorised third party access attacks are simulated, and both the re-
play attack and eavesdropping attack is among the performed attacks. The outcome of the
attacks is successful, and the security is deemed to be unsatisfactory. The author then con-
cludes the paper with possible platforms in order to prevent the unauthorised third party
access attacks from being successful. One of the measures suggested in order to prevent
replay attacks from being successful is to include timestamps in the packets sent. Thus
in case a packet is reused the timestamp would differentiate from an original packet. The
approach of presenting an overview on the platform security and then performing several
attacks on the network is the exact approach used in this thesis.
This thesis will give insight on what integration platforms currently are available for
the manufacturer, and what two of the integration platforms do in order to keep the com-
munication secure. The thesis also gives insight of what consequences a faulty use of a
14
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integration platform can lead to. In the conclusion of this thesis one of the evaluated plat-
forms will be recommended and the recommendation will be based on both information
gained during the theoretical analysis and information gained during the case study.
15
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Chapter 2
Review of Communication protocols
This chapter consists of an introduction to several different integration platforms on the
market. After briefly introducing a few integration platforms, Z-Wave and ZigBee are
chosen to be described thoroughly and evaluated. Themethod used to evaluate is described
in the first chapter (1.3). After the evaluation one of the platforms is chosen for the case
study.
2.1 Overview
When developing a smart home appliance there are plenty of different communication
protocols to chose from. The wide range of integration platforms is a result of the fact that
no exclusive standard has yet been set. Some companies see this as an opportunity to set
their own standard, in other words implement their own integration platform.
When choosing which protocols to evaluate in this thesis, the availability and popular-
ity are considered. The integration platforms presented below were the top results when
searching for newly published scholar papers on Google Scholar:
• Z-Wave - One of the biggest and most common platforms in toady’s market is the
integration platform Z-Wave developed by Sigma Design. Sigma Design claim that
of all smart home communications used today approximately 80% of it utilises Z-
wave technology [13]. There are more than 300 companies that produce products
supporting Z-wave technology and all these companies are in a consortium called Z-
waveAlliance. All these companies produce wireless products that are interoperable
with each other[14]. International Telegraph Union Telecommunication Standard-
ization Sector (ITU-T), a sector of the specialised agency of the United nations, has
described the lower layers of the protocol used by Z-Wave.
• Enocean - The platform is developed by the German company Enocean GmbH.
This platform is mostly used in Europe. During the platform’s early years the re-
17
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leased products lacked the use of an encryption algorithm when constructing data
packets. This allowed various types of attacks. However, the company has recently
announced that they soon will upgrade their security and include an AES-128 en-
cryption on their data packets [15]. Compared to the other platforms the amount of
research and scholar papers found surrounding this technology is rather few. Eno-
cean provides a solution that can solely run on green energy which can be regarded
as a environmentally friendly alternative. Green energy, which is energy that is re-
ceived from environmental friendly platforms, such as solar panels or kinetic energy
[16]. The energy harvesters are also released by Enocean.
• ZigBee - ZigBee is a communications protocol developed by the company ZigBee
Alliance. The protocol is categorised as a WiFi protocol and is commonly used in
smart home networks. The protocol is based on the IEEE 802.15.04 standard that is
well known and which describes the physical and media access control layers. The
higher levels are however developed solely by ZigBee Alliance. There are some
regular differences between ZigBee and the competitors, such as frequency bands,
maximum amount of devices and the maximum range between two communicating
devices. However, what really sets ZigBee apart from its competitors is its use of
an open source protocol stack. The use of an open source stack gives the user the
option to characterise the platform based on own preferences.
• Insteon - Insteon is a integration platform registered trademark of Smartlabs Inc.
This platform was very popular about ten years ago and was reported having 40% of
the market share by that time [17]. However, related papers and technical documen-
tation surrounding its technology is extremely limited when searching on engines
such as Google Scholar, which would restrict the depth of the security evaluation.
The items listed above are some of the top results found when searching for integration
platforms on Google Scholar. However, being realistic and having certain restrictions on
time and resources only a few platforms could be evaluated in this report. In order to
determine which protocols to evaluate we set a few requirements. One of the requirements
is that the technology uses awireless platformwhich all platforms presented above support.
Only solutions that are obtainable by the public user are considered, which excludes some
platforms that are currently in development and platforms that are expensive.
Another property valued highly is the popularity of the platform. However, it is difficult
to measure the popularity since we could not find a recent estimate of the market share for
the currently used communication protocols. Instead we studied the amount of third party
manufacturers and resellers which could be found at some of the solutions homepages
[18] [19] [20]. It is assumed that the availability, supply and demand is increased with
the popularity of a platform. It is also assumed that the market for the third party device
manufacturers is bigger if a technology is widely used. An exception to the popularity
requirement is if the platform deem to have a revolutionary property. Due to the popularity
amongst manufacturers[14] it should be perceived as a good candidate for the evaluation.
The last requirement is that only platforms that has some recent updates and studies
are considered. In order to evaluate a platform the technical documentation or published
papers for the integration platform should be available on the Internet and on the search
engine Google Scholar. When searching with the query Insteon or Enocean, there is a lack
18
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Z-Wave Enocean ZigBee Insteon
Wireless platform Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mesh topology supported Yes Yes Yes No
Encryption used AES-128 None AES-128 AES-256
Information availability Plenty Scarce Plenty Scarce
Table 2.1: Demonstrates themain factors making a platform eligi-
ble for the thesis. The last row, Information availability, represents
the availability of scholar articles on Google Scholar.
of recent papers. Because of the lack of information, the other integration platforms were
prioritised over Insteon and Enocean.
ZigBee has gotten a lot of attention recently because it is based on an open standard.
The technology is not directed to any specific group of users, which makes it suitable for
any type of user or company. Due to its cheap retail price and free licenses, any company
could use the technology in their products. The vast availability makes the forum for
questions bigger and more diverse, which is beneficial from an information point of view.
The broad community might be an argument to why a user chooses this type of technology.
The table 2.1 is constructed to demonstrate and summarise the requirements and com-
paring the eligible platforms and communication protocols with each other. The two cho-
sen platforms are ZigBee and Z-Wave.
2.2 Z-wave
The requirement for setting up a smart home using Z-Wave technology is that the network
at least consists of one gateway, one controller and one smart home device, such as a lamp,
surveillance camera, etc. If a mobile device is to be used instead of a controller, the whole
network needs to be connected to the Internet. The gateway translates the commands sent
from the mobile devices to packets that are used for communicating between the devices
on the home network. The reason why mobile devices are unable to send packets directly
to the smart home devices is because communication is done on different frequency bands.
When communicating through radio frequencies, protocols define what a message is
complemented with. Information such as the source address, the destination and the mes-
sage are all used to construct a packet that is sent. Therefore the protocol will also deter-
mine the security process each packet has to go through in order to ensure that third parties
are unable to intercept or eavesdrop on the communication.
A protocol can often be split into several different layers where each layer has its own
properties. Each packet can be split into different headers that carry information about
what properties are set. All layers provide own headers to a packet.
The protocol used in Z-wave has the following four layers:
1. Physical Layer
2. Transport Layer
3. Network Routing Layer
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4. Application Layer
Even though there are different Z-wave modules the protocol layers remain the same, and
most of the layers provide the same features independent of module version [21]. Each
layer will be explained independently in their own subsection.
2.2.1 The physical layer
The Physical layer, which in some cases is referred to as the radio layer, is closest to the
hardware. This layer describes how the communication between a transceiver (a con-
troller) and a receiver (device being controlled) is done. As previously mentioned, Z-
wave uses radio waves for communication. When using radio waves for communication,
the user needs to consider signal properties of a transceiver such as attenuation, frequency,
encoding, interference, etc.
The maximum distance between two communicating devices is highly dependent on
the environment and the equipment used. However, there is a source stating that in an
indoor and perfectly open environment the maximum range is 75 feet, which translates to
roughly 22 meters [22]. Some of the radio specifications are dependent on what region
the Z-Wave chipsets are manufactured for [23] and some examples of the specifications
are listed in table 2.2.
Europe USA
Center frequency 868.42 MHz 868.40 MHz
Modulation Scheme FSK FSK
Encoding Manchester Non-Return-to-Zero (NRZ)
Table 2.2: Displays some of the specification differences between
the devices manufactured for different regions. The presented
specifications contain some of the needed specifications when set-
ting up and constructing hardware that is able to eavesdrop on the
communication.
Each packet sent on the physical layer contain a payload, which in turn has a variable
size. The maximum allowed size of the payload data is 64 bytes [24].
The physical layer also provide communication features, such as the collision avoid-
ance and back off algorithms. These features are not visually detectable by the end user.
However, the communication features are of grave importance in order to get the home
network working properly.
Collision avoidance ensures that a device is communicating with one device at a time,
in other words it ensures that the communication throughout the whole conversation is in
between the same devices. This is done by setting the receiving device into a receiving
state, which then makes the unit unreachable to other devices. The device will only be able
to receive packets from one device at a time. Besides avoiding collisions inside a network
this feature will block an attack where a third party tries to jumble the original packet with
other packets.
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2.2.2 The transport layer
The packets sent on the transport layer contains information revolving the devices (sender-
s/recipients) and the home network information. The figure 2.1 displays the organisation
of a packet at the transport layer [23]. If the frame format of the packet sent is set to
multicast, the destination field is split in to two fields and carries a destination bit map.
Figure 2.1: The frame structure of the transport layer.
The following list is used in order to understand what the packets consist of and how
the information is presented:
• Home ID - This ID is unique for each individual network. As seen in figure 2.1 the ID
is described by 4 bytes which in turn restricts the amount of available home networks
to around 4 million unique addresses (232). The primary node of a network sets the
Home ID which then is inherited by all the nodes connected to the same network.
• SourceNode ID - This is the node ID of the sending device. The ID is 1 byte long and
unique for each node in the same network. The length of the ID would restrict the
network to 256 nodes per network, however, there some addresses that are allocated
and thus restrict the highest amount of connected devices in a single network to 232
[22] [23].
• Frame Control - This field consists of 2 bytes describing how the packet is to be sent.
One of the configurations of the frame control is the frame formats. There are three
different frame formats; singlecast, multicast and broadcast.
• Destination ID - This field’s size and content is dependent on what type of frame
format is used. In the scenario when a controller is communicating directly with the
node that is to be controlled, it will contain the ID of the destination. In the case
when the frame format is set to multicast there will not be a single destination but
instead a destination bit map [25]. The multicast format is used to transmit a single
packet to several receivers. The maximum amount of receivers is the same as the
maximum amount of devices in a network, i.e. 232 devices [23]. The broadcast
format will broadcast a packet to all the devices in a network.
• Data Payload - This field consists of the application layer which will be described
later in this section (2.2.4).
• Checksum - The algorithm used to calculate the checksum is presented in the ITU
standard ITU-T G.9959 [26]. The code for generating the checksum is presented in
the following code block:
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BYTE GenCheckSum (BYTE ∗Data ,BYTE Length ){
BYTE CheckSum = 0xFF ;
f o r ( ; Length > 0 ; Length −−){
CheckSum ^= ∗Data ++;}
r e t u r n CheckSum ; }
2.2.3 The network routing layer
The purpose of the network routing layer is scanning the network topology andmaintaining
an updated routing table. Every device included into a network carries its own network
topology which contains information about other devices in the same network. Depending
on the type of device used, the network routing layer can resend packets if needed.
The network topology used in the network routing layer is mesh networking. Mesh
networking allows devices to find a route between devices even if no direct connection is
available. An example of a mesh network is shown in figure 2.2, in this example all six
devices are in range of each other which enables direct communication. A mesh network
can also be partially connected whereas some devices are out of each others reach and
have no direct connection, but are able to establish a connection through other devices.
Figure 2.2: A mesh network consisting of 6 devices. All devices
are within range of each other and thus able to directly communi-
cate.
2.2.4 The application layer
The application layer handles the parsing of packet payload and the decoding of com-
mands. The first application header sets the frame format in its first byte and the remaining
bytes contain command information and associated command parameters.
The Z-Wave commands can be divided in two categories, the first being protocol-
related commands and the others being application-specific commands. All devices using
Z-Wave technology provide the most basic protocol-related functionality, such as assign-
ing Home ID and Source Node ID (both described in 2.2.2) to a device. The application-
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specific commands vary depending onwhat type of device used. An example of an application-
specific commands is when locking or unlocking a door.
Static positioned controllers, often called static controllers, provide a functionality
called Static Update Controller. The purpose of the Static Update Controller is to keep
an updated routing table between all the controllers in a network. The static controller
receives an updated routing table from the primary controller, which is the controller that
includes other devices in the network. The static controller then sends out the updated
routing table to all the non-primary controllers in the network. If the primary controller
is damaged or lost the static controller is able to assign another controller to become the
new primary controller.
Static ID Server acts as a register or a depot keeping track of Source Node IDs that
can be signed to controllers. If this feature is used with the static update controller it gives
the end user access to some of the primary controller options in more than one single
controller. An example of an option is including new devices.
With lacking security measures both the Static ID Server and the Static positioned con-
trollers can be targeted by third party attackers, and the outcome could be that unauthorised
parties are able to include their own controllers and devices into the network.
2.2.5 Security Overview
The use of radio frequencies makes the communication accessible by any party in the
communications proximity and the developers have to take measures to secure the com-
munication. Some examples of the measures taken are encryption, authentication methods
and secure keys.
There is a risk when using the combination of a static update controller and a static id
server. If the authentication process is faulty, or no authentication process exists, it could
allow the outsider to include devices into the network. Including new devices, such as
remote controllers, could in turn allow the attacker to remove existing devices or commu-
nicate with the existing devices. This possibility appears because of the functionality to
physically add new devices when using a static id server.
When including a new device in a network the initial communication between the
controller and the new device consists of a key exchange. The key exchange is done by the
new device generating a key which is used to encrypt the packets that are sent in between
the controller and new device. The key exchange protocol used for Z-Wave is demonstrated
in the figure 2.3.
The initial key is generated by the new device and it is constructed with the use of a
pseudo random number generator (PRNG). The pseudo random number generator used
is integrated on the Z-Wave chip of the device. The key is encrypted with a default value
which is set on the Z-Wave chip’s firmware. If a third party is eavesdropping during the
initial key exchange it will only be able to pick up an encrypted version the key. If the
default value, which is used to encrypt the generated key, is discovered the key used for
communication can be decrypted and the third party will be able to eavesdrop on the com-
munication. In order to perform this kind of attack successfully the attacker needs to be
present at the exact moment when an initial setup or re-installation of the device is done.
This limits the time frame of when the attack can be performed.
Ameasure that a user can take in order to secure the key exchange is to switch the radio
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Figure 2.3: A key exchange between a controller and a secure de-
vice. The sizes of each packet is written in hexadecimal, hence
the 0x before the size-values. The first step of the communication
consists of ensuring that the device is available and ready, when a
response is sent the controller requests a nonce in order to prove
that it is a original packet. The controller uses the received nonce
accompanied with an authentication header and the encrypted net-
work key to calculate a MAC, which is sent to the device. Accom-
panied with theMAC, the encrypted network key is also sent in the
same cipher packet. The device uses the same nonce technique to
ensure that it is original and sends a encrypted message with the
received key to confirm that the new key is set.
transmission signals to a low power mode. The low power mode shortens the range be-
tween the controller and the device being included, which also shortens the range between
the potential eavesdropper and the device. This forces the attacker to move closer to the
devices in order to be in the communications proximity. However, the third party will still
need access to the default value set on the product which makes the third party dependent
on the manufacturer of the device.
If the key exchange is successful, both parties will have a network key (KN). Through
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the network key both parties calculate two new keys, each of length of 16 bytes (128 bits).
One of the keys is used to authenticate the origin of a packet (Korigin). The other key is
used to encrypt the frames before they are sent (Kencrypt).
When using encryption in the communication, the options of an attacker are limited.
The attacker has two possibilities, the first is figuring out the key used in the encryption
algorithm in order to eavesdrop on the communication. The other possibility is tricking
the network into believing that their device is a part of the same network in order to com-
municate with the other devices in the network.
In order to calculate the two keys, the Z-Wave chips use Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) on a block cipher mode called Electronic CodeBook (ECB). The calculations can
be simplified into the two equations displayed in the list below [23]. ECB is a block cipher
mode where a packet is split into separate blocks and each block is encrypted separately
from each other. If there are identical blocks when the packet is split, the encrypted blocks
will also become identical. For a third party that eavesdrop on the communication might
detect patterns when the packets lack any type of verity. Depending on the amount of text
encrypted, it is better to use a mode that scrambles the block’s content in order to hide
patterns. If a solution is found to the encryption method, the use of this mode will make
the protocol susceptible to a lot of attacks, one type being replay attacks [23].
Kencrypt = AES - ECBKN(Passwordencrypt)
Korigin = AES - ECBKN(Passwordorigin)
Both Passwordorigin and Passwordencrypt are hardcoded values set on the Z-Wave
firmware.
As previously mentioned Z-Wave uses the encryption algorithmAESwhich is a widely
used standardised cryptographic algorithm. AES is a symmetric key algorithmwhere both
the encryption and the decryption key are the same. According to NIST, a federal agency,
AES-128 will remain secure to at least 2030 based on the current cryptanalytic progress
and the growth rate in computer power in order to successfully execute a buteforce attack
[27]. This ensures that the packets that are encrypted will not be decrypted without access
to the encryption key (Kencrypt).
To ensure that the packets are not manipulated and that the packets origin is genuine,
Z-Wave also makes use of cipher block chaining message authentication code technique
(CBC-MAC). This is used during the data origin authentication. The CBC-MAC tech-
nique uses a block cipher to construct a message authentication code (MAC). The CBC
mode makes sure the encryption of each block is dependent on the correct encryption of
the previous block (similar to the calculation of the CBC-MAC, seen in figure 2.4). The
difference between these is that each block will form its own output in CBC mode. This
form of interdependence ensures that if one of the blocks are altered or manipulated it
affects the encryption of the following blocks.
When using CBC-MAC on variable length messages, security threats appear. The
threat appears if an attacker knows two correct pairs in sequence, which is consisting of
plain text and their CBC-MAC [28]. How this is done is briefly shown in the example 2.1
and 2.2.
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The attacker has access to two of the frames sent in sequence. To calculate the MAC
of these messages Z-Wave uses the plain text for the message (M1/M2) and the CBC-MAC
(t).
f (M1, t) = MAC1, f (M2, t) = MAC2 (2.1)
The device is susceptible to an attack where the attackers XOR:s the last block an extra
time, which nullifies the first XOR. This is demonstrated in the following equation:
f (M1, t) = MAC1, f (MAC1 ⊕ M2, t) = MAC2 (2.2)
There are several measures available in order to make the cipher secure when using
CBC-MAC with variable length messages. Examples of measures are input-length key
separation, length prepending or encrypting the last block. These methods are common
and will not be explained in this report [29]. Although there is no source to prove that
Z-Waves makes use of one of these, it is very likely that they do in order to heighten their
security.
Before a device can send commands to another device it needs to alert it (if it is in a
sleeping mode), or prepare it for communication. In the first packet the initiator asks the
receiver for a nonce value. The receiver then uses a pseudo random number generator to
generate a nonce value which is returned. The initiator will then insert this nonce in its
frames during this exchange. This works both ways, meaning that if the receiver wants to
send information to the initiator it will also ask for a nonce value before sending its own
frame. This is done in hope to prevent unauthenticated parties from performing a replay
attack.
The 64 bit nonce value is generated during theMAC calculation and a in depth descrip-
tion of how it is generated can be read in the security evaluation paper [23]. The equation
proves that the nonce values generated are completely random through the use of a pseudo
random number generator used.
Since some companies develop products that support the Z-wave protocol through the
chip it is important that they use it correctly. In one case [23], it was found that the improper
use of the protocol lead to third party access to a closed off functionality.
2.3 ZigBee
The protocol provided by ZigBee is open source which means that any developer or com-
pany is allowed to use the technology for free. To ensure that their reputation remains
untainted ZigBee Alliance certifing the products they believe hold the security standards.
Only products can be certified, not companies, since ZigBee Alliance analyse the security
of a specific product. Each product that is certified is listed on their website [30].
The ZigBee protocol is built on IEEE 802.15.04 which is a standardised protocol that
defines two of the lower layers. To be more specific ZigBee uses the Physical layer and the
Media Access layer of IEEE 802.15.04. On top of these two layers ZigBee applies its own
two layers that together create an integration platform suited for smart home networks.
The two layers are the Network layer and the Application layer [31].
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Figure 2.4: The calculation of the CBC-MAC. The frame is split
into several different blocks, the first block is XOR;ed with a pre-
defined value (0 in this scenario). The result of which is encrypted
with a key. The result of the first block is XOR;ed with the next
block and this is repeated until meeting the last block. Once the
last block is met the output will form the CBC-MAC value. The
initial seed used (0) can be replaced with a initial vector, which can
be a sequence of randomly generated numbers or a static vector of
numbers.
2.3.1 The physical layer
The physical layer is not a layer that ZigBee has developed themselves instead they use
a well known standard called IEEE 802.15.04. Radio frequencies are used by ZigBee in
order to communicate. As mentioned in 2.2.1 the use of RF media as communication will
force the manufacturers to consider the existence of attenuation, interference, frequency,
etc.
The distance between a receiver and a controller for the modules ZigBee IP and ZigBee
920IP is between 50-200 meters [32].
The IEEE 802.15.04 standard defines two different physical layers, which operate on
two different frequency ranges. The two physical layers represent three different non li-
censed frequency bands. The 2.4 GHz band is used on the worldwide devices. The lower
frequency range operates on 868/915 MHz, the lower band (868 MHz) is used in Europe
and the upper band (915 MHz) is used in a few countries such as United States, Australia,
and more [31].
The radio specifications are obtainable in the protocols specifications document [31]
and vary dependent on what region the technology is developed for [33].
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The packet structure on the physical layer contains the Physical Service Data Unit,
which also is known as the media access frame. The maximum length of this field is 127
bytes [34]. The frame has several different formats, dependent on what the frame is used
for a certain format is used. As an example the fields in a acknowledge frame differs from
the fields in a data frame. There are four different MAC frames, all with different purposes.
2.3.2 The media access layer
The media access layer in IEEE 802.15.04 provides features such as data transmission ser-
vice, acknowledged frame delivery, association and disassociation, channel access mecha-
nism, frame validation, guaranteed time slot management and beacon management. There
are four different types of packet frames each serving different purposes. Explinations of
the features and the different packet structures can be read in the specification [33].
2.3.3 The network layer
The network layer serves several purposes and provide different functionality, such as
starting up networks, organising the joining and leaving of a device, routing between the
devices, searching for devices within range and storing information regarding neighbour
devices. There are three different types of ZigBee devices in a network [31].
• ZigBee Coordinator - The main device in a home network is the coordinator and
each network always contains one. The coordinator is used as a storage and a trust
center [31], storing information about the network and their security keys. The trust
center is used by all devices in a network to obtain secure keys. When two devices
want to communicate the coordinator establishes a common master key which will
represent a link between the two parties.
• ZigBee End devices - An end device is not able to communicate with other end de-
vices. They only communicate with Routers and Coordinators. End devices provide
minimal functionality related to the network, and instead they provide functionality
seen by the user such as a light sensor or a light switch.
• ZigBee Router - An intermediate router that passes on data between devices. How-
ever, some routers also run application functions.
The network layer provides a property list called the network information base, and the
properties are used to alter the behaviour and specifications of the network. Two examples
of properties changing the behaviour of the network are nwkAllFresh and nwkSecureAll-
Frames. The attribute called nwkAllFresh indicates whether the received network pack-
ets should be analysed for their originality. The attribute nwkSecureAllFrames indicates
whether certain security measures are taken on the data frames that are sent and received.
When establishing connection between devices in a network different topologies can
be used. The topologies supported by ZigBee are star, tree and mesh topologies. The
range of topology alternatives allow the user to use the network topology suited for their
purpose.
A network using mesh topology is demonstrated in the figure 2.2.
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The star topology works similarly to a local area network where each computer is
directly connected to a switch, or a hub. The switch directs the packets sent to its intended
destination, or destinations. The figure 2.5 demonstrates a network consisting of 6 devices
using star topology.
The tree topology is a combination of two or more star networks which are all con-
nected to each other through a buss topology. A network using tree topology is demon-
strated in the figure 2.6. In networks using tree topology routers use a hierarchical routing
strategy to route control messages and data to other parties.
Figure 2.5: A star topology consisting of 6 nodes.
Figure 2.6: A tree topology consisting of 9 nodes.
Only a selection of the supported topologies enable beacon oriented communication.
For networks using the tree topology routing the beacon oriented communication is avail-
able, while mesh topology use a full peer-to-peer type communication, where no regular
beacons are emitted [31].
2.3.4 The application layer
The top layer of the protocol is called the application layer, and is the layer where the man-
ufacturers and developers apply their own products that use ZigBee technology. The layer
itself consists of several sub-layers. The Application Support sublayer, which maintains
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tables of device pairs that use each others functionality and pairs that need each other in
order to work properly. The binding is used to forward messages between the two devices.
Another sublayer in the application layer is called ZigBee Device Object. This sublayer
has several responsibilities such as defining device roles in the network (router, coordinator
or end device), the initiating and/or responding to the binding requests.
The last sublayer is called the Application Frame work. This sublayer represents the
environment where the application object is hosted. The manufacturer of a product using
ZigBee technology will implement their own functionality on this sublayer. The function-
ality differs dependent on the product, and can literally be anything form a light switch to
a locking mechanism for a door.
2.3.5 Security Overview
As previouslymentioned the ZigBee technology is based on IEEE 802.15.04, whichmeans
that the security measures taken in the standardised IEEE protocol are relevant when eval-
uating the security of the ZigBee protocol. The security evaluation will be separated in two
different subsections, separating the IEEE 802.15.04 measures from the ZigBee applied
measures.
Security of IEEE 802.15.04
There are several different precautions taken by the standardised protocol in order to ensure
reliable security. One precaution includes enforcing the use of message authentication
code’s (MAC). The use of MAC ensures access control, which means that unauthorised
parties are prohibited from joining the communication. Using MAC also ensures that the
message integrity is kept secure, in other words received packets are guaranteed to be
unaltered by any unauthorised third party. Authenticated devices are able to differentiate
between packets sent by legitimate parties and non legitimate parties.
Themessage authentication code can be seen as a cryptographic checksum for a packet,
it is calculated both when sending and receiving a packet. In order to compute the code
both parties (sender and receiver) need to share a mutual secret key. The key is a parameter
in the algorithm usedwhen calculating themessage authentication code, thus the key needs
to be kept unknown to the unauthorised users. The sender constructs the packet it wants to
send and then calculates a message authentication code for that specific packet. The MAC
is dependent on each field in the packet. After calculating the MAC, the code is added to
the packet in its own field. When the packet is received by the device on desired destination,
the content is once again used to calculate the MAC. The result of the calculation is then
compared to the value in the MAC field (code calculated by the transmitter). If the packet
has been tampered with, it becomes detectable because of the differentiating MAC value,
and if there is a difference between the values the packet is ignored.
Another precaution taken is encryption, which is used to ensure that the communica-
tion maintains its confidentiality. In other words encryption ensures that the information
transferred between the parties are kept secret from unauthorised parties. The encryption
algorithm used has a semantic security property, which ensures that if the same values
is encrypted twice it will most likely give two different ciphertexts (results). In order to
achieve this property, the encryption algorithm uses a nonce value. The nonce is used to
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introduce variation into the packets. This will in turn force the receiver to use the nonce
when decrypting the packet.
The encryption algorithm used is the AES with block size 128 bits. The standardised
IEEE 802.15.04 protocol supports several different mode of operations and all modes offer
different properties. The supportedmodes are Counter mode (CTR), cipher block chaining
message authentication code mode (CBC-MAC) and two different Counter with CBC-
MAC modes (CCM and CMM*). However, the mode used by ZigBee is CCM* and will
therefore be the only one that is evaluated.
CCM* is a combination of two other block ciphers, one being the counter mode and the
other being CBC-MAC (explained in 2.4). There is, however, a modification to the regular
CBC-MAC mode in CCM* mode. The modification allows for the calculated CBC-MAC
value (the result) to have a reduced length. The CTR mode is demonstrated in the figure
2.7. It combines a plain text header with an encrypted payload, in order to protect the
integrity of both the header and the payload. Another property that separates CCM* from
ordinary CCM is the fact that CCM* only allow encryption and authentication. The CCM*
demonstrated with the help of the figure 2.8.
Figure 2.7: The CTR mode uses a counter to construct a stream
cipher from a block cipher. The counter is concatenated with the
nonce value. The differences in the input becomes the counter
value since the nonce is identical in each input. The counter can
be generated by any type of function with the requirement that the
number used in the sequence is not reused for a long time.
The packets sent and received on the network layer have the option of being secured.
One way to use security on the network layer is by setting an attribute called nwkSecure-
AllFrames in the network information base to true. There are several ways to enforce the
network security and if one of the requirements are fulfilled ZigBee uses a frame protection
mechanism. The frame protection mechanism is both used when sending and receiving
packets, and can be read in detail in the specification [35].
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Figure 2.8: In CCM* the constructed packet is padded with null
bytes (padding). The packet is then used with an initialisation
vector to calculate a CBC-MAC value (MIC). The nonce is con-
structed through packet specific properties, and is used to encrypt
the payload and the MIC (during the CTR encryption). Lastly, the
length of the MIC is checked and reduced if needed. The possible
length of the MIC is 0, 32, 64 or 128 bits. The 0 bit length implies
that the packet lacks authentication.
Security of ZigBee
To secure the communication between different devices, ZigBee uses a network key and
several different link keys. Link keys are used when two devices are communicating di-
rectly using the frame format unicast. The network key is used when the frame format is
set to broadcast. Both keys consists of 128 bits, and all the devices in a network share a
common network key.
Both the network key and link keys can be set through either key-transport and pre-
installation. Supplementary to these mechanisms link keys can also be set through key-
establishment.
Setting a key through pre-installation implies setting the key during the factory instal-
lation.
Setting a key through key-transport implies setting the key through communication
from one device to another. There are two different commands used when transporting
keys, one is labelled as a secure command while the other is labelled insecure. When using
the secure transport-key command both the key and the key source (similar to Trust Cen-
ter) is sent. The insecure transport key command is used when constructing initial keys,
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and does not provide any cryptographic protection. Thus the initial key is sent in cleartext.
The insecure command type is mainly meant for situations where the key-transport can be
realised without any risk of third party eavesdroppers. An example of such a scenario is
when the communication is done on a out-of-band channel where the secrecy and authen-
ticity can be guaranteed, however the responsibility of secrecy and authenticity is set on
the user.
The key-establishment mechanism used for link keys have certain requirements, such
as network size of at least two devices (an end device and a coordinator). Another require-
ment is that the establishment is prefaced with a trustprovisioning step. The trustprovi-
sioning can consist of simply exchanging trust information between the communicating
parties. An example of trust information that can be exchanged is a master key. When
the trustprovisioning is fulfilled the establishment of the actual key consists of three steps,
these are listed below.
• Short-lived data is exchanged.
• The short-lived data is used to derive the link key.
• Another calculation is done in order to confirm that the derivation of key was suc-
cessful.
The application support layer located on the application layer establishes and manages
keys. Beside the key related processes it also handles the security process when receiv-
ing and sending packets on the application layer [35]. The security process differs from
the security process followed when sending and receiving packets on the network layer.
An explanation of security process on the application layer can be read in detail in the
specification [35].
ZigBee provides a configurable security process, where the user is allowed to skip
authenticity processes or encryption processes for individual devices and a network as a
whole. However, configuring a network to skip a authentication processes or an encryption
processes might result in a non secure network.
2.4 Evaluation
In this section the scenarios introduced earlier (see section 1.3) will be theoretically eval-
uated and and their outcome will be hypothesised. Following the hypothesis, the platform
is analysed from four aspects described earlier in Method (see the section 1.3). All of the
conclusions and outcomes of the platform are based on the platforms security overview.
Lastly, a comparison between the platforms will conclude this chapter.
2.4.1 Z-Wave
Theoretical evaluation of attacks
Replay attack - After considering the tools being available, it is possible to state that
this attack should not be possible since the nonce-value makes use of a generated
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nonce and a received nonce. Considering how the nonce is generated (described in
detail [23]), the device will recognise that the nonce value is invalid, thus making it
impossible to perform a replay attack.
1. Connect Unit-A so it controls a lamp/light bulb (receiver) - Possible by setting
up a simple home network.
2. Unit-B sniffs the traffic - Theoretically possible by developing a sniffer that
listens to the frequency that is used for communication. Alternatively simply
buying Z-Wave’s own released sniffer [36].
3. Unit-A sends a request to switch the lamp/light bulb on - Use a controller to
change the state.
4. The receiver should change state - It should receive the packets without any
complications.
5. Unit-A sends a new request to switch the lamp/light bulb off - Use a controller
to change the state.
6. The receiver should change state - It should receive the packets without any
complications.
7. Unit-B does a replay attack by resending the first packet trying to turn on the
lamp/light bulb - With the use of the sniffer the first sent packet should be
picked up and then in this stage transmitted.
8. The receiver should change state - The attack should fail and the lamp should
remain turned off, and the device should not be affected to the packet because of
its non-valid nonce value. The nonce should be invalid since each conversation
should generate its own unique nonce value, thus the resending of a previously
used nonce should count as a non-valid nonce value.
Eavesdropping and deciphering status attack - It is fully possible to sniff the pack-
ets but it is complicated to decipher the packets sent. Since the encryption is done
by the AES 128 algorithm, which as earlier mentioned is believed to be unbreakable
until at least 2030 [27], and if the device is following the Z-Wave protocol it should
not send any plain text. Theoretically the third party device will not have the same
Home ID which means that all the communication from the third party device will
not affect the home network.
1. Connect Unit-A so it controls a lamp/light bulb(receiver) - Possible by setting
up a simple home network.
2. Unit-B tries to communicate with the lamp/light bulb - The attacker (unit-B)
tries to communicate with unit-A through a constructed packet. Without know-
ing the Home ID it is impossible to get the receiver to respond. However, if the
attacker has eavesdropped on Unit-A’s previous conversations, and the packets
are sent in clear text, the attacker is able to read the Home ID.
3. The receiver responds with its current state/condition(on/off) - The eavesdrop-
ping attack should fail and the packet sent should be ignored. No response
should be sent since the receiver should not respond to any device that has a
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different Home ID. If the Home ID and the device ID is known by the attacker
and the attacker has access to a tool altering the content of the packets sent they
may be able to get Unit-A to receive the packets sent.
Possible vulnerabilities
This section will discuss if and how the platform handles some common measures taken.
An important and recurring fact is that the device manufacturers and developers (third
party developers that use Z-Wave technology) are responsible for using the technology
right. A recommendation is to only buy products that are verified by Z-Wave Alliance, thus
recommended and tested by Z-Wave to confirm that the device is using Z-Wave properly.
• Authentication process - Based on the information and security introduced in the
security evaluation (see 2.2.5) the authentication process provided is safe, both when
communicating between devices and setting up a network. Each key exchange and
communication is using proper authentication processes. However, the authentica-
tion also relies on the manufacturers of the device. Devices come with a default key
and if this key is the same for each copy of that device, it is easy for a third party to
obtain the key.
Some devices require physical interaction when including them into the network, an
example of such a device is the wall plug used in the case study (see 3) [37]. This
can be seen as another precaution taken when authenticating the user. However, this
is not the case for all devices, thus can not be a concluding factor.
• Protocols vulnerability - When searching for articles or papers presenting vulner-
abilities in the Z-Wave protocol on Google Scholar only papers presenting faulty
usage of the protocol were found. Thus we conclude that no protocol vulnerabilities
has been found as of yet.
• Access through devices - An example of how access through devices is possible, is
given in one of the previous subsections (see the section 2.2.4). In the example the
home network uses a combination of a static ID server and a static update controller
since these two are able to assign a new primary controller or a new device. This
would, however, require physical interaction where the third party user would need
to gain to the fixed devices.
Each device will need to be included in a network before being able to communicate
with the other devices in the system, thus no foreign devices are able to access or
communicate with the other devices in the home network.
• Vulnerability towards Denial of service attacks - A denial of service (DOS) attack
is in most scenarios possible via jamming when dealing with wireless communica-
tions independent of the integration platform used. The jamming is accomplished
by transmitting high continuous streams of noise on the frequency used in the net-
work, causing interference. The problem derives from the communicating devices
inability to differentiate between relevant and non-relevant packets. Thus the use of
a publicly known frequency enables the attacker to jam the network. The equipment
35
2. Review of Communication protocols
required to jam a network is easily obtained by the public and users can even develop
their own transmitters to operate on the same frequency.
Besides jamming the network, an attacker is able to perform an denial of service
attack directed at the Internet used by the network. A DOS attack directed at the
Internet can lead to a non-functioning network, the network being unable to retrieve
requests deriving from controllers connected through the Internet. The user is able
to keep their smart home local, in other words not connecting the functionality to
the Internet, which will prevent the attacker from being able to attack the system
gateway. However, disabling the Internet connection means that the smart home
will not be available for external controllers such as smart phones or laptops.
Due to the use of mesh topology in Z-Wave, attackers performing the denial of ser-
vice attacks are able target specific units in order to keep the unit in a receiving state
(explained earlier in 2.2.1) or drain the units battery.
2.4.2 ZigBee
Theoretical evaluation of attacks
Replay attack - After considering the security analysis, it is apparent that a replay
attack should not be possible. One reason to why it will fail is because of the use
of CBC MAC values. Each time a packets CBC MAC is calculated, output will
be different since it is partially dependent on the generated nonce. CCM* also en-
sure that each packet will have a slight different output, since CCM* uses a counter
accumulated with the nonce which will generate originality.
1. Connect Unit-A so it controls a lamp/light bulb(receiver) - Possible by setting
up a simple home network.
2. Unit-B sniffs the traffic - Theoretically possible by developing a sniffer that
listens to the frequency that is used for communication
3. Unit-A sends a request to switch the lamp/light bulb on - Use a controller to
change the state.
4. The receiver should change state - It should receive the packets without any
complications.
5. Unit-A sends a new request to switch the lamp/light bulb off - Use a controller
to change the state.
6. The receiver should change state - It should receive the packets without any
complications.
7. Unit-B does a replay attack by resending the first packet, trying to turn on the
lamp/light bulb - With the use of the sniffer the first sent packet should be
picked up and then in this stage transmitted.
8. The receiver should change state - The attack should fail and the lamp should
remain turned off, and the device should pay not attention to the packet because
of its non-valid nonce and CBC-MAC values.
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Eavesdropping and deciphering status attack - It is fully possible to sniff packets,
however the challenging part is to decipher the packets sent. Since the encryption is
done by the AES 128 algorithm, which is believed to be unbreakable until at least
2030 [27], and if the device is following the ZigBee protocol it should not send any
plain text (if not instructed to do so). Theoretically the third party device will not
be included in the trust center or the route map, which means that packets sent from
these devices will be ignored (explained earlier in 2.3.5 and 2.3.5).
1. Connect Unit-A so it controls a lamp/light bulb(receiver) - Possible by setting
up a simple home network.
2. Unit-B tries to communicate with the lamp/light bulb - With the information
gained construct a packet manually and transmit it.
3. The receiver respondswith its current state/condition(on/off) - The attack should
fail and the packet sent should be ignored. No response should be sent since
the receiver should not pick up or respond to any device that is not included in
their map. This was explained in the receiving of packets on the application
layer (explained in 2.3.5).
Possible vulnerabilities
This section will discuss if, or how, the platform handles some common measures taken.
An important and recurring fact is that the device manufacturers and developers (third
party developers that use ZigBee technology) are responsible for using the technology
right. A recommendation is to only buy products that are verified by ZigBee Alliance, thus
recommended and tested by ZigBee to confirm that the device is using ZigBee properly.
• Authentication process - Based on the information and security introduced in the
Security Evaluation (see section 2.3.5) the authentication process provided is safe,
both when communicating between devices and setting up a network. There are
different ways to set up a home network and with the use of the proper security
levels both the establishments of keys and the communication between devices will
theoretically remain secure.
The authentication process in ZigBee is dependent on the trust center, which in turn
becomes the target for third party attackers trying to falsely authenticate themselves.
Without access to the master key, which is used when encrypting link keys between
two parties, the third party is theoretically unable to authenticate as a trusted device.
The only way to gain access to the master key is through pre-installation, which
requires manufacturer access. The other way to obtain the master key is through
a secure key-transport which requires that the party is included in the trust center
(both pre-installation and key-transport are explained earlier in 2.3.5). Thus one
could conclude that the platform provides a secure authentication process.
• Protocols vulnerability - During our survey we found no present vulnerability in
either protocols (IEEE 802.15.04 or ZigBee). However, since the ZigBee proto-
col is dependent on a external protocol it has spread dependencies, meaning that a
vulnerability in the external protocol becomes a vulnerability in their own protocol.
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• Access through devices - If an unauthorised user is able to access the coordinator
they may be able to include their own devices, and through their devices they are
able control other devices in the network. Another possibility appears when using
binding (explained earlier in 2.3.4) which should not have binding since it might let
an attacker control one device through another, however this would require the two
devices to be included in the same network.
• Vulnerability towards Denial of service attacks - The issues with denial of service
(DOS) attacks in ZigBee are similar to the ones described in Z-Wave (explained
earlier in 2.4.1) since the physical layers of both platforms share a lot specifications.
However, each packet received from an unknown source starts an authentication
process which involves the trust center. Thus a DOS attack can be directed at more
than one specific unit.
2.4.3 Comparison
The two solutions share the same hypothesis in the scenarios and have similarities in their
protocol structures, such as encryption algorithm and mesh topology. However, the pro-
tocol also have several differences. The security differences that we consider important
when imagining our scenarios will be introduced in this section.
In the case of the replay attack both of the platforms rely on the use of nonce values.
However, generating the nonce values differ and the nonce values are used in different parts
of the communication. In Z-Wave the nonce value is generated by using a PRNG number
generated on the hardware combinedwith other parameters (explained earlier in the section
2.2.5). In ZigBee however, the nonce generated for the CCM* decryption/encryption is
generated through parameters that are independently obtainable by both parties (explained
earlier in the figure 2.8).
Another difference between the two platforms are the block cipher mode of operation
used. In ZigBee the CCM* mode is used, which consists of two consecutive modes and
in Z-Wave the CBC-MAC mode is used. While the CCM* partially consists of the CBC-
MAC mode it is noteworthy that the process used in Z-Wave would be easier to follow
when dissecting packets, based on the fact that it consists of a shorter process. In terms of
security CCM* use the same block cipher (CBC-MAC) with an extension which could be
argued to be more secure.
Another difference that is relevant when considering the attacks performed is the au-
thentication process that is used. In ZigBee packet received from unknown sources are
authenticated through the trust center, which means that all devices in a network com-
pletely trusts the trust center. In Z-Wave, however, the devices are mainly authenticated
through the used Home ID in the packet.
The protocol used for ZigBee allows for more customisation’s which sets the plat-
form apart from the other platforms. The user is allowed to turn off different security
measures, such as encryption, in the network information base (introduced earlier in the
section 2.3.3). In Z-Wave, however, the usage is more static in the way that most features
are essential for the communication to work, which restricts the user from altering the be-
haviour. From this we conclude that for the inexperienced user who have little interest and
knowledge about the protocol it might be preferred to use Z-Wave in order to avoid exploit-
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ing security processes. However, for the more technically interested and knowledgeable
user it might be a good alternative to use Zigbee in order to achieve the results desired.
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Chapter 3
Case Study
This chapter describes the case study performed to get a first hand experience of attacking
a integration platform. The chapter begins by choosing one of the integration platforms
that were theoretically evaluated. After choosing a platform a description of the smart
home and the attacking equipment is briefly presented. The chapter is concluded with a
evaluation of the scenarios presenting the results of the attacks.
3.1 Platform Selection
Based on the comparison presented in section 2.4.3 it is hard to claim that one of the
platform is more secure than the other. Both platforms remain secure even if they tend to
take different measures. However, due to the popularity and the restricted way of use (also
explained in 2.4.3), Z-Wave was chosen for the case study.
3.2 Design
To ensure that the Z-Wave Technology is used fairly only equipment tested and supported
by Z-Wave Alliance were chosen. To be able to simulate the smart home used in the scenar-
ios (see section 1.3) several different Z-Wave components are required. The components
required consists of a system gateway, a wall plug and a remote controller. Supplementary
to the appliances used to construct the smart home several tools are required when both
receiving and transmitting packets.
• Hardware tools:
– System gateway - The system gateway used in this case study is Fibaro Home
Center 2 Gateway. The purpose of the system gateway is to act as the central
hub of the network. Each device in the network is connected to the gateway
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which in turn is connected to the Internet. Thus all information surrounding
the appliances are obtainable through the system gateway.
– Wall plug - The wall plug used in this case study is Fibaro Wall Plug. The wall
plug acts as a switch turning on and off depending on the signal received. Due
to the work environment we believe that the wall plug is an easier alternative
when implementing this scenario.
– Remote controller - The primary controller used in this case study is Aeon
Labs Minimote EU. A controller is needed in order to both control the home
appliances without accessing the Internet and in order to be able to include
new equipment in to the network.
– Two transceivers - The two transceivers used is Texas instruments CC1110.
These transceivers are used to transmit falsely constructed packets and to re-
ceive the communication sent in the home network.
– USB to UART - The USB to UART adaptor used is Future Technology Devices
International Ltd C232HD. In order to connect the transceivers to a computer
a USB to UART adaptor is needed. These adaptors provide power and raw bit
streams from the transceivers to the computer, and vice versa.
• Software tools:
– SmartRF Flash Programmer - used to flash program the transceivers 1.
– SRecord 1.63 - used to convert the transceiver specifications to HEX-format 2.
– Z-Force - used to both transmit and receive the sent packets 3.
Accessing functionality and checking status of the appliances through a computer re-
quires the system gateway to be connected to the same network router as the computer.
All the Z-appliances using Z-Wave technology are used to construct a home network by
following the instructions received with the equipment.
The CC1110 transceivers are flash programmed; one is flash as the receiver whilst
the other is flashed as the transmitter. In order to flash the CC1110’s the SmartRF flash
programmer is used and the radio specifications are converted to HEX-format through
SRecord.
A schematic of the set up is demonstrated in the figure 3.1.
To be able to understand the packets contents the mac frame is studied (explained and
demonstrated in figure 2.1). An example of a packet sent when turning on a binary switch
is "F8 48 90 3A 01 41 0B 0D 02 20 01 00 81". According to the frame structure the initial
4 bytes represents the home ID, "F8 48 90 3A". The home ID is followed by the source
ID "01", the frame control "41 0B", length "0D", the destination ID "02", the data payload
"20 01 00" and, lastly, the checksum "81".
1http://www.ti.com/tool/flash-programmer
2http://srecord.sourceforge.net/download.html
3https://code.google.com/p/z-force/
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Figure 3.1: Demonstrates how the case study was set up. The
CC1110 RX (Receiver) received all communication on the used
frequency, both the communication on the home network and the
constructed packets sent by the CC1110 Tx (transmitter). The
computer is used to construct the packets sent by the CC1110 TX
(transmitter) and to display the received packets by the CC1110
RX (Receiver).
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3.3 Evaluation
Replay attack - According to the theoretical evaluation the replay attack should be
unsuccessful 2.4.1.
1. Connect Unit-A so it controls a lamp/light bulb(receiver) - The system gateway
is plugged in and the controller is connected by using the inclusion button. Af-
ter including the controller into the home, it is automatically set as the primary
controller and can be used to include the wall plug into the smart home. A
desk lamp is connected to the wall plug and is set to on.
2. Unit-B sniffs the traffic - The receiving chip plugged in to the computer through
the USB to UART adapter and the computer runs the program ZForce to dis-
play the sniffed packets. All of the packets sent in the range of the transceiver
is picked up and displayed on the computer.
3. Unit-A sends a request to switch the lamp/light bulb on - Press the controllers
on button that is connected to the wall plug.
4. The receiver should change state - The wall plug turns on and the lamp is on.
The computer now displays the packet content as "F8 48 90 3A 01 41 09 0D
02 20 01 FF 7D".
5. Unit-A sends a new request to switch the lamp/light bulb off - Press the con-
trollers off button that is connected to the wall plug.
6. The receiver should change state - The wall plug turns off and the lamp is off.
7. Unit-B does a replay attack by resending the first packet, trying to turn on the
lamp/light bulb - The packet sniffed is used to construct a identical packet.
The constructed packet is transmitted by the CC1110 chip flashed with the TX
program.
8. The receiver should change state - The lamp changes state, and the attack is
successful. The result of the attack is seen both physically (lamp is turned on)
and through the status on the gateway.
Eavesdropping and deciphering status attack - According to the theoretical eval-
uation the eavesdropping and deciphering status attack should be unsuccessful 2.4.1.
1. Connect Unit-A so it controls a lamp/light bulb(receiver) - The system gateway
is plugged in and the controller is connected by using the inclusion button. Af-
ter including the controller into the home, it is automatically set as the primary
controller and can be used to include the wall plug into the smart home. A
desk lamp is connected to the wall plug and is set to on.
2. Unit-B tries to communicate with the lamp/light bulb - Without prior knowl-
edge and just following the patterns seen when dissecting the packets, a new
packet is constructed in ZForce. The constructed packet is then transmitted
through the USB to UART adaptor which in turn converts the packet into raw
bit streams sent on the transmitting C1110 chip.
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3. The receiver responds with its current state/condition(on/off) - The attack was
unsuccessful in getting it Unit-A respond, however, eavesdropping is still pos-
sible since the appliances transmit packets in clear text and sniffing is possible.
The only requirement is that the attacker understands the coding of the data
payload. The only way to get Unit-A to respond to Unit-B’s requests is to use
a identical Home ID. This can be set when the attacker is using tools such as
ZForce.
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Chapter 4
Discussion
4.1 RQ1
It is safe to assume that both of the studied protocols consider that security against third
party attacks is important even if they take different measures to prevent attacks. The
combination of handshakes and key exchanges differ and are dependent on which protocol
is used. Discussion about the differences, strengths, weaknesses and challenges with the
different platforms follow.
One of the properties differentiating the protocols is the openness of ZigBee. A techni-
cal documentation describing details of all processes such as the construction of a packet
or a establishment of a connection between two devices are obtainable by any user. The
concept of releasing all technical details to the public is a way for the manufacturer to con-
vey confidence in the platform. The openness allows the end user, as well as companies,
to try out the technology and gives them opportunity to discover security vulnerabilities.
However, the ability to change the packet structure also allow users to use tweak the tech-
nology in order to serve the user’s purpose, which may seem flexible and good but actually
may result in a security vulnerability. Certain steps in the communication are configurable
whereas the user is allowed turn off certain authentication steps or the construction related
steps when receiving and transmitting a packet. The ability to manipulate the behaviour
increases the risk of an erroneous usage of the technology [35].
Z-Wave is not as adjustable as ZigBee and may seem more restricted in usage when
comparing the two. This does not imply that Z-Wave is static in its usage since the user is
only given directions to follow. A user is able to ignore the directions and implement as
they prefer. An example of directions given is the use of the PRNG generator (explained
in 2.2.5) included on the Z-Wave chip, however, there is nothing preventing the user from
using a static predefined set of numbers instead of the generated input.
There are obtainable specifications describing the packet structure for both ZigBee
and Z-Wave, which allows for the attacker to understand the content of a packet. However,
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during the case studywe found it a bit difficult to understand certain headers and the content
of the payload used in Z-Wave. This could be considered as the most challenging when
attacking such a system. If the packet content is encrypted, or if the user has no access to
the structure and coding of commands, it is nearly impossible to understand the contents
of the packets sniffed.
The use of a trust center in ZigBee forces all devices during their first interaction to
rely on a third unit. Involving more parties when establishing a communication medium
is reliable in the sense that they share a common trusted unit that confirms the validity of
other parties. The use the trust center also hinders third parties from attacking individual
devices in a network. However, involving more parties can be considered unreliable in
the sense that if the trust center is infiltrated the whole network becomes vulnerable. The
coordinator in a network acts as the trust center, once a device is included into the network
the trust center adds link keys and a network key to the included device. It is safe to assume
that no external device is able to pose as the trust center since all devices in a network have
traded keys with the trust center.
Theoretically both platforms provide secure protocols for setting up a smart home. Z-
Wave relies on good authentication processes when establishing a connection between de-
vices and CBCMACwhen masking the communication. To assure originality and authen-
ticity of packets Z-Wave uses nonce values. ZigBee relies on proper key establishments,
secure key-transports and its trust center to assure authenticity. To assure packet security
ZigBee uses CCM*, which also uses nonce values to ensure originality. In both platforms
the block ciphers provided the use the AES 128 cryptographic algorithm for encryption.
The user is given the option to turn off the encryption in ZigBee. Since CCM* combines
the CTR mode and the CBC MAC mode it is hard to compare the block ciphers with each
other. Z-Wave’s platform relies on CBC-MAC only, and it is only used when setting up
a communication medium for the key exchange. When the key exchange is successfully
finished, the keys are used for the communication.
The companies behind ZigBee and Z-Wave both have other companies analysing prod-
ucts using their technology to confirm that the technology is used correctly. It may be com-
forting for a user to know that experienced protocol testers confirm the products security
when a manufacturer of a product only uses other companies technology.
4.2 RQ2
Considering a scenario where both platforms are implemented correctly the smart home
would be secure in both cases. However, due to the well tested security of IEEE 802.15.04
and the consistent authentication and encryption processes, ZigBee would be a more likely
to be the safe alternative between the two platforms.
ZigBee supports a lot of configuring, including altering how packets are received and
sent. However, altering the authentication process or the encryption processes might result
in a non secure smart home network. Thus we conclude that a smart home that uses the
initial non configured ZigBee protocol is a secure alternative, while a smart home using a
configured ZigBee protocol might result in a non secure network.
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4.3 RQ3
A challenge encountered when implementing a network that uses wireless communication
is to prevent unauthorised parties to gain access to the communication sent. The challenge
arise when there is no physical connection between two parties and the communication
can not be directed specifically at a party. All parties using the same platform are awaken
when a device is within the sending proximity and thus causes all devices awaken to waste
energy. Besides wastefulness the communication also become available by unauthorised
third parties if they obtain the radio specifications used for communication.
Due to the far reach of the radio waves, the attacking distance do not pose as a challenge
for the attacker. As mentioned earlier, one measure that the user can take in order to restrict
the range of attacks is to set the communication into a smaller range mode.
In this thesis the case study needed equipment that used the same frequency as Z-
Wave in order to receive and transmit packets. Luckily, the equipment is easily obtained,
inexpensive and obtainable by the public. This, regretfully, means that users with technical
knowledge or interest are able to obtain the right equipment for sniffing and transmitting
packets. The specifications of the radio settings are also obtainable by the public, some of
which are presented earlier in this thesis (seen in the table 2.2). Thus there were no real
challenge when sniffing up Z-Wave packets. All the software used is easily obtainable and
legally free of charge, which allows for the user to find something suited for their purpose.
During the case study there was a difference between the theoretical hypothesis and
physical outcome of the replay attack. The outcome of the theoretical evaluation was that
the attack would be unsuccessful whilst the case study proved the replay attack to be suc-
cessful. The attack was successful due to the fact that the equipment lacked the use of a
valid nonce value, instead the equipment used a static value which caused the construction
of unvaried packets. With the use of a proper nonce value the replay attack would become
unsuccessful. If the appliances would use nonce values the values would have been unpre-
dictable since they are generated with the use of a PRNG generator (explained in 2.2.5).
Thus an attacker would be unable to perform replay attacks.
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Chapter 5
Summary
This thesis has presented several different communication protocols used when imple-
menting smart home networks. Two scenarios are introduced where two different third
party attacks are performed, one being a Replay attack and the other being an eavesdrop-
ping attack. An in depth analysis of two communication protocols, Z-Wave and ZigBee, is
presented along with a overview on their security against third party unauthorised attacks.
The main purpose of the security overview was to prove if the protocols take measures
against third party unauthorised attacks and if one protocol is more secure than the other.
Theoretically both protocols proves to be secure against the two attacks due to various
reasons.
A case study is performed where a smart home network using the Z-Wave technology
is set up, and the scenarios used in the theoretical analysis is performed practically. The
outcome of the case study proved to be different from the theoretical hypothesis because
the manufacturer used a static value as a nonce, which created unvaried packets. Thus the
network could not differentiate original from falsely constructed packets. The practical
outcome however, did not conclude that the protocol had a security vulnerability instead
it demonstrated that false use of the technology can have grave impact on the security of a
network.
5.1 Conclusions
The security of both platforms is deemed secure against unauthorised third party access
attacks if the equipment follow the technical description of the protocol. In our case study
we encountered a device with flawed security, which was result of false implementation
from the manufacturer. There are cases where products that are supported by the testing
companies still fail to follow the protocol, such as the set up used in this thesis case study
or a door lock presented in the paper Security Evaluation of the Z-Wave Wireless Protocol
[23]. A rule of thumb is to only include products supported by the platform security test-
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ing companies (Z-Wave Alliance or ZigBee Alliance depending on the platform), which
supposedly follow the protocol as it was theoretically intended.
The recommended platform differs depending on the home network desired, and par-
tially on the user setting up the network. If a lot of configurations are to be done, and the
user desires consistent authentication and encryption processes, we would recommend us-
ing ZigBee. If the user is interested in setting up a home network and know for a fact that
they will not perform any sorts of configurations, we would recommend using Z-Wave be-
cause of the fact that the platform has no configurability which will ensure that no security
processes are skipped.
The implementation of a smart home using Z-Wave technology is rather easy and does
not consist of many challenges with regard to the unauthorised third party access attacks.
One challenge is that the communication will remain obtainable by any party since it com-
municates over radio frequencies, and are sent to all devices in range. Another challenge
is choosing products that provide secure platforms. To determine if a platform is secure
the user could either manually attack their product or trust the review done by the platform
security testing companies.
5.2 Future work
To further analyse the security of the technology more smart home setups should be tested,
since only one smart home network (3 devices) is analysed during this thesis. If more
equipment using Z-Wave technology were bought and tested and all equipment prove to
be susceptible to the replay attack, there could be a error with the platform and not the
equipment.
In order to strengthen the conclusion in the thesis several equipment that fulfils all the
recommended security properties should be analysed. Equipment where nonce values and
AES-128 cryptography is used properly.
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I takt med att “smarta hem” har blivit ett allt mer populärt koncept har säkerheten
blivit en väldigt viktig fråga. Under detta examensarbete undersöks det hur felaktigt
användande av en integrationslösning för smart hem kan göra hemmet känsligt för
attacker.
Under de senaste åren har paradigmet Internet of 
Things varit ett mycket omtalat ämne i den teknologiska 
världen. Paradigmet har introducerats i industrier som 
exempelvis transport, sjukvård och hemnätverk. Smarta 
hem, som bygger på hemnätverk, är något som blivit 
mycket populärt och skälet till detta är att tillgängligheten 
av utrustning och det ökade intresset av att göra egna 
smarta lösningar i hemmet. Vid uppsättning av ett smart 
hem kan flera olika lösningar implementeras och det 
som skiljer lösningarna ifrån varandra är den struktur 
och process som används vid trådlös kommunikation. 
Med den växande trenden har säkerheten i smarta hem 
ifrågasatts då en bristfällig teknik kan möjliggöra intrång 
från obehöriga. Den trådlösa kommunikationen kan 
inte riktas till en enskild mottagare utan finns tillgänglig 
för alla inom räckhåll från den sändande enheten. Detta 
examensarbete har som målsättning att undersöka 
säkerheten i ett par olika lösningar och försöka besvara 
några av de säkerhetsfrågor som finns. Vidare fastställs 
vilken lösning som är bäst anpassad för smarta hem från 
en säkerhetssynvinkel.
 Under arbetet har kommunikations protokollen 
som utnyttjats av ZigBee och Z-Wave analyserats på 
djupet ur en säkerhetssynvinkel. Potentiella brister 
i säkerheten betraktas och riskerna som dessa kan 
utgöra presenteras. Vidare sätts ett scenario upp för 
en Replay attack där en utomstående part fångar och 
skickar ut paket, och ett scenario för en Eavesdropping 
attack där fångad kommunikation försöker att tolkas. 
Resultaten av dessa scenario analyseras teoretiskt. Båda 
integrationslösningar jämförs med varandra och bevisar 
på olika sätt att de teoretiskt har tagit åtgärder för att 
förebygga dessa attacker. 
 Baserat på Z-Waves strikta protokoll och deras 
popularitet på marknaden väljes den för en praktisk 
undersökning. Ett smart hem konstrueras med den 
utvalda teknologin och de två scenarion som beskrivits 
utförs i praktiken. Resultatet av de praktiska attackerna 
visar att det teoretiska resultatet inte sammanfaller med 
det praktiska resultatet. Skillnaden beror på att den 
produkt som undersökts i det praktiska experimentet 
använde sig av ett statiskt värde istället för ett genererat 
slumpvärde. Detta leder till att det inte blir någon 
variation i kommunikations paketen vilket leder till att 
paket som innehåller samma kommando blir identiska. 
Slutsatsen som dras är att varje produkt som används i 
ett smart hem bör kontrolleras så att de följer riktlinjerna 
för hur protokollet ska användas. Om man inte har 
kunskap eller utrustning för att själv testa produkter kan 
man använda befintliga säkerhetskontroller som företag 
i samarbete med tillverkaren av integrationslösningen 
tagit fram, Z-Wave Alliance i Z-Waves fall.
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